Zero Trust Architecture – Overview

Notes about ZeroTrust Security

WORK IN PROGRESS

  1. What is Zero Trust?
    1. History of ZT
  2. Definitions, Concepts, & Components of ZT
    1. Tenets
    2. Design Principles
    3. Pillars
    4. Components & Elements
    5. Logical Components of Zero Trust Architecture
    6. Mapping ZTA components to SDP
  3. CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model for the identity pillar
  4. CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model for the networks pillar
    1. Function: Network segmentation
    2. Function: Network traffic management
    3. Function: Traffic encryption
    4. Function: Network resilience
    5. Function: Visibility and analytics Capability
    6. Automation and orchestration Capability
    7. Function: Governance Capability
  5. Single Packet Authorization (SPA)
  6. open-source firewall tools for ZTA
    1. pfSense
    2. OPNsense
    3. ModSecurity
    4. IPFire
  7. Firewalls for ZTA
    1. Fortinet
  8. open-source network segregation tools for Zero Trust
    1. Calico
    2. Cilium
    3. OpenZiti
    4. Flannel
    5. Open vSwitch
  9. open-source workload identity tools
  10. open-source authentication tools for ZTA
    1. Keycloak
    2. Hanko.io
    3. ZITADEL
    4. Authentik
  11. open-source ZTA authorization tools
    1. Cerbos PDP
    2. OpenFGA
    3. Open Policy Agent (OPA)
    4. Netbird
    5. Pangolin
  12. Tokens
  13. Links

What is Zero Trust?

Trust nothing, verify everything.

https://www.cerbos.dev/blog/20-open-source-tools-for-zero-trust-architecture

https://research.aimultiple.com/ztna-open-source/

https://zerotrustnetworkaccess.info/


History of ZT

pre 2010 ZT Research by DISA, DOD and Jericho Forum.

2010 ZT was first coined by John Kindervag.

2013 CSA’s SDP concept

2014 Google BeyondCorp

2018 Forrester’s Zero Trust eXtended (ZTX) Ecosystem Report

2020 NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-207, Zero Trust Architecture


Definitions, Concepts, & Components of ZT

Tenets

A tenet is defined as a principle generally held to be true. According to the USA DOD, ZT has five major tenets.

  • Assume a hostile environment
  • Assume breach
  • Never trust, always verify
  • Scrutinize explicitly
  • Apply unified analytics

Design Principles

Denying access until the requestor has been thoroughly authenticated and authorized
withholding access until a user, device, or even an individual packet has been thoroughly
inspected, authenticated, and authorized. The access to resources is temporary and
reverification is required. The timespan of the access is defined by policies.

Allowing access to the network changes with ZT; requesters (users, machines, processes)
aren’t allowed access to anything until they authenticate who they are.

Allowing access to resources only after the requesting entity has been authorized.

Enforcing least privilege, specifically, granting the least amount of access required.

Requiring continuous monitoring of existing security controls’ implementation and
effectiveness (e.g., controls over access or user behavior).


Pillars

  • Users/identities
  • Device/endpoints
  • Network/environment
  • Applications and workload
  • Data
  • Visibility and analytics
  • Automation and orchestration
  • Governance

Components & Elements

At a high level, ZTA requires three core components before any logic can be applied to allow a
decision to be made for access:

  • Communication
  • Identity
  • Resources

In addition to these three core components, ZT is also composed of two other fundamental
elements:

  • Policy
  • Data sources

Control PlanePolicy decision point (PDP)
Data PlanePolicy enforcement point (PEP)
SP 800-207, NIST key logical
components of a ZTA

Logical Components of Zero Trust Architecture

NIST SP 800-207: ComponentsDescription
Policy engine (PE)
Policy administrator (PA)
Policy enforcement point (PEP)

Supporting Components

NIST SP 800-207: Components
Continuous diagnostics and mitigation (CDM) system
Industry compliance system
Threat intelligence feed(s)
Network and system activity logs
Data access policies
Enterprise public key infrastructure (PKI)
ID management system
Security information and event management (SIEM) system

Mapping ZTA components to SDP

ZTA: NIST SP 800-207SDP: CSADefinitions
Subject/EntityInitiating Host (IH) or ClientSubject/entity/IH/client: represents an individual or entity accessing resources.
These accessing entities can be user devices or non-person entities such as hardware, network devices, software applications, and
services. An SDP user may use an SDP client or browser to initiate.
Policy Decision Points (PDPs)
Policy Administrator (PA) & Policy Engine (PE)
SDP ControllerPDPs determine the “rules” applicable to each authenticated identity and communicates them to the PEP. The PDP is made up of a PA and a PE. The PE makes and logs the decision (as approved, or denied), and the PA executes the decision.

The SDP Controller is a policy definition, verification, and decision mechanism (a ZT PDP). It maintains information about which users/groups via which IHs (i.e.,userdevices) have permission to access which organization’s resources via AHs (on-premises or in the cloud).
Policy Information Points (PIPs)IAM, Endpoint & Data Security, Resource
Protection and
Analytics
PIPs are an access control mechanism
component that provides telemetry and other
information generated by policy or collected by supporting components (IAM, analytics, etc.) that the PDP needs for making policy
decisions.
Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs)Accepting Host (AH) or SDP GatewaysThe PEP acts as a logical gateway to ensure that the correct access has been granted to the right entity, with the proper access levels to an approved resource.

A PEP may be implemented in SDP-specific software or hardware. It allows or disallows network traffic to a target service (which may be
anapplication, a lightweight service, or a resource) based on instructions from the SDP controller.

AHs entities are logical components that front applications, services, and resources being accessed and protected by the SD. In some SDP deployment models, the AH function is performed by an SDP Gateway).

In SDP, the AHs are the ZT PEPs that ensure the
“rules” used to determine “who” can access to “what,” “when,” for “howlong,” and “for what purpose” are enforced.
ResourceResourceThe applications, services, and resources being accessed.

CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model for the identity pillar


CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model for the networks pillar

A network refers to an open communications medium including typical channels such as agency internal networks, wireless
networks, and the Internet as well as other potential channels such as cellular and application-level channels used to transport
messages.

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security/zero-trust/cisa-zero-trust-maturity-model-networks


Function: Network segmentation

Description
CISA ZTMM Stage
Traditional StatusAgency defines their network architecture using large perimeter/macro segmentation with minimal restrictions on reachability within network segments.

Agency may also rely on multi-service interconnections (e.g., bulk traffic VPN tunnels).
Initial Maturity StatusAgency begins to deploy network architecture with the isolation of critical workloads, constraining connectivity to least function principles, and a transition toward service-specific interconnections.
Advanced Maturity StatusAgency expands deployment of endpoint and application profile isolation mechanisms to more of their network architecture with ingress/egress micro-perimeters and service-specific interconnections.
Optimal Maturity StatusAgency network architecture consists of fully distributed ingress/egress micro-perimeters and extensive micro-segmentation based around application profiles with dynamic just-in-time and just-enough connectivity for service-specific interconnections.

Function: Network traffic management

CISA ZTMM StageDescription
Traditional StatusAgency implements dynamic network rules and configurations that continuously evolve to meet application profile needs and reprioritize applications based on mission criticality, risk, etc.
Initial Maturity Status

Agency establishes application profiles with distinct traffic management features and begins to map all applications to these profiles. Agency expands application of static rules to all applications and performs periodic manual audits of application profile assessments.
Advanced Maturity Status

Agency implements dynamic network rules and configurations for resource optimization that are periodically adapted based upon automated risk-aware and risk-responsive application profile assessments and monitoring.
Optimal Maturity Status

Agency implements dynamic network rules and configurations that continuously evolve to meet application profile needs and reprioritize applications based on mission criticality, risk, etc.

Function: Traffic encryption

CISA ZTMM StageDescription
Traditional StatusAgency encrypts minimal
traffic and relies on manual
or ad hoc processes to
manage and secure
encryption keys.
Initial Maturity Status

Agency begins to encrypt all traffic to internal applications, to prefer encryption for traffic to external applications, to formalize key management policies, and to secure server/service encryption keys.
Advanced Maturity Status

Agency ensures encryptions for all applicable internal and external traffic protocols. Manages issuance and rotation of keys and certificates, and begins to incorporate best practices for cryptographic agility.
Optimal Maturity Status

Agency continues to encrypt traffic as appropriate, enforces least privilege principles for secure key management enterprise-wide, and incorporates best practices for cryptographic agility as widely as possible.

Function: Network resilience

CISA ZTMM StageDescription
Traditional StatusAgency configures network
capabilities on a case-by
case basis to only match
individual application
availability demands with
limited resilience
mechanisms for workloads
not deemed mission critical.
Initial Maturity Status

Agency begins to configure network capabilities to manage availability demands for additional applications and expand resilience mechanisms for workloads not deemed mission critical.
Advanced Maturity Status

Agency has configured network capabilities to dynamically manage the availability demands and resilience mechanisms for the majority of their applications.
Optimal Maturity Status

Agency integrates holistic delivery and awareness in adapting to changes in availability demands for all workloads and provides proportionate resilience.

Function: Visibility and analytics Capability

CISA ZTMM StageDescription
Traditional StatusAgency incorporates limited
boundary-focused network
monitoring capabilities with
minimal analysis to start
developing centralized
situational awareness.
Initial Maturity Status

Agency employs network monitoring capabilities based on known indicators of compromise (including network enumeration) to develop situational awareness in each environment and begins to correlate telemetry across traffic types and environments for analysis and threat hunting activities.
Advanced Maturity Status

Agency deploys anomaly based network detection capabilities to develop situational awareness across all environments, begins to correlate telemetry from multiple sources for analysis, and incorporates automated processes for robust threat hunting activities.
Optimal Maturity Status

Agency maintains visibility into communication across all agency networks and environments while enabling enterprise-wide situational awareness and advanced monitoring capabilities that automate telemetry correlation across all detection sources.

Automation and orchestration Capability

CISA ZTMM StageDescription
Traditional StatusAgency uses manual
processes to manage the
configuration and resource
lifecycle for agency
networks and environments
with periodic integration of
policy requirements and
situational awareness.
Initial Maturity Status

Agency begins using automated methods to manage the configuration and resource lifecycle for some agency networks or environments and ensures that all resources have a defined lifetime based on policies and telemetry.
Advanced Maturity Status

Agency uses automated change management methods (e.g., CI/CD) to manage the configuration and resource lifecycle for all agency networks and environments, responding to and enforcing policies and protections against perceived risks.
Optimal Maturity Status

Agency networks and environments are defined using infrastructure-as-code managed by automated change management methods, including automated initiation and expiration to align with changing needs.

Function: Governance Capability

CISA ZTMM StageDescription
Traditional StatusAgency implements static
network policies (access,
protocols, segmentation,
alerts, and remediation) with
an approach focused on
perimeter protections.
Initial Maturity Status

Agency defines and begins to implement policies tailored to individual network segments and resources while also inheriting corporate-wide rules as appropriate.
Advanced Maturity Status

Agency incorporates automation in implementing tailored policies and facilitates the transition from perimeter-focused protections.
Optimal Maturity Status

Agency implements enterprise-wide network policies that enable tailored, local controls; dynamic updates; and secure external connections based on application and user workflows.

Key Features & Technologies of an SDP

Single Packet Authorization (SPA)


open-source firewall tools for ZTA

pfSense

OPNsense

ModSecurity

IPFire

Firewalls for ZTA

Fortinet

Network & User Identity Authentication Services | FortiAuthenticator

User & Authentication | FortiGate / FortiOS 7.6.2 | Fortinet Document Library

SCIM servers | FortiGate / FortiOS 7.6.2 | Fortinet Document Library

Privilege Access Management (PAM)

https://www.beyondtrust.com/

https://github.com/BeyondTrust

https://github.com/dan-snelson/BeyondTrust-EPM

https://www.netwrix.com/privilege-secure.html

open-source network segregation tools for Zero Trust

Calico

Cilium

OpenZiti

Flannel

Open vSwitch

open-source workload identity tools

open-source authentication tools for ZTA

Keycloak

Hanko.io

ZITADEL

SCIM v2.0 (Preview) | ZITADEL Docs

Authentik

SCIM Provider | authentik

Setup Authentik as Radius Provider | Rink Spies.com

open-source ZTA authorization tools

Cerbos PDP

OpenFGA

Open Policy Agent (OPA)

Netbird

https://github.com/netbirdio/netbird?tab=readme-ov-file

Pangolin

GitHub – fosrl/pangolin: Tunneled Reverse Proxy Server with Identity and Access Control and Dashboard UI

Nextcloud

Complete guide to Nextcloud OIDC authentication with Authentik · Jack Henschel’s Blog

Zitadel

https://www.illumio.com/de/solutions/zero-trust

Tokens

Yubico | YubiKey Strong Two Factor Authentication

Zero Trust Framework with Strong Authentication I Yubico

SSH

Securing SSH with FIDO2

Nitrokey | Secure your digital life

Nitrokey GmbH
Rheinstraße 10 C
14513 Teltow
Deutschland

https://onlykey.io/collections/all

NIST

SP 800-207, Zero Trust Architecture | CSRC

Zero Trust Architecture

NIST Offers 19 Ways to Build Zero Trust Architectures | NIST

Implementing a Zero Trust Architecture | NCCoE1

https://pages.nist.gov/zero-trust-architecture/index.html

https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/1800/35/2prd

https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework

https://zerotrustnetworkaccess.info/

https://research.aimultiple.com/ztna-solutions/

https://openziti.io/docs/reference/tunnelers/

https://www.bsi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Informationen-und-Empfehlungen/Zero-Trust/zero-trust.html

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XACML

https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/the-complete-guide-to-xacml/

https://github.com/authzforce/core

https://github.com/authzforce/server

https://github.com/authzforce/restful-pdp

https://github.com/casbin

https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6231365

https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_jboss_enterprise_application_platform/6.4/html/security_guide/sect-fine_grained_authorization_using_xacml

https://github.com/franciscogouveia/rbac-core